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KENTUCKY LAW
SURVEY
Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
INTRODUCTION

The format for this year's Survey will follow that used in previous Surveys.' Developments in corporation law at the federal
level will be discussed first. This will be followed by review of a
group of selected cases dealing with corporate law principles under state law.
Discussion of federal developments will begin with analysis
of a significant decision by the United States Supreme Court relating to the constitutionality of state takeover legislation. This
analysis will be followed by a discussion of a case from the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with the recovery of
short-swing profits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The discussion will conclude with considerations of two additional federal cases, one from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and one from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, dealing
with the requirements for maintaining suits under Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5.
Developments in corporation law at the state level will begin
with a discussion of a recent decision by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals dealing with the elements of valuation to be considered
in determining the fair value of stock under the appraisal provi-

• Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University
of n1i-

nois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
1 For previous corporation law Surveys, see Ham, Corporations,70 KY. L.J. 223
(1981-82); Ham, Corporations,69 Ky. L.J. 453 (1980-81); Ham, Corporations, 68 KY.
L.J. 495 (1979-80); Ham, Corporations,67 KY. L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham, Corporations,
66 Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Corporations,65 Ky. L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Corporations, 64 KY. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Corporations,63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1974-75).
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sions of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act. This discussion
will be followed by an analysis of a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealing with the enforceability of
stock transfer restrictions and a decision by the Supreme Court of
Idaho dealing with the enforceability of buy-out arrangements.
The discussion will conclude with an analysis of a decision by the
Supreme Court of Alabama dealing with the enforceability of
supermajority quorum and voting requirements for board and
shareholder action.
I.

A.

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

Tender Offers

No doubt one of the most significant decisions handed down
by the United States Supreme Court in the corporate and securities area during the present Survey period was its decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,2involving the constitutionality of the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act. 3 The constitutionality of state takeover
legislation has been the subject of debate since the advent of state
takeover statutes in the late 1960s. 4 Attack on the constitutionality of such state legislation has customarily been under either
the supremacy5 or commerce" clauses of the United States Constitution. Both of these constitutional issues were before the
Supreme Court in MITE, as well as a jurisdictional issue of mootness. Due to the differing opinions held by the members of the
Court on these issues, the only issues resolved by the Court, as a
Court, were that the case before them was not moot 7 and that the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act was unconstitutional under the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the
local interests it served were outweighed by the substantial burden it imposed on interstate commerce. 8
2

102 S.Ct. 2629 (1982).

3 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
4 See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 699-702

(1974-75).
5 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, el. 2.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 See Part II of the opinion written by Justice White. 102 S.Ct. at 2635.

8 See Part V-B of the opinion written by Justice White. 102 S.Ct. at 2641-43.
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The litigation in MITE resulted from a cash tender offer
which MITE Corporation, a corporation organized under the
laws of Delaware with its principal executive office in Connecticut, initiated on January 19, 1979, for all the outstanding shares
of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation. 9 MITE initiated its tender offer by filing a Schedule
14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission as required
by the Williams Act, which regulates tender offers at the federal
level.10 MITE, however, made no effort to comply with the Illinois Business Take-Over Act," but instead filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Williams Act preempted
the Illinois Act and that the Illinois Act violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constituti6n. 2 MITE also sought a
temporary restraining order, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions, prohibiting enforcement of the Illinois Act by
the Illinois Secretary of State.13 Shortly thereafter, Chicago Rivet
sought unsuccessfully to bring a suit in Pennsylvania, where it
did most of its business, to enjoin MITE from continuing with its
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The Illinois Secretary of State
thereupon announced his intention to issue a cease and desist
order requiring MITE to abandon its plans to make a tender offer
for the shares of Chicago Rivet, and Chicago Rivet announced its
plans to seek an injunction in the Illinois state courts to prevent
MITE's proposed tender offer.' 5 At this point, MITE renewed its
request for injunctive relief in federal district court.16

9 102 S.Ct. at 2633.
10 Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
1

102 S.Ct. at 2634.

12 Id.
13 Id. Appellant James Edgar, as the Illinois Secretary of State, was charged with the

administration and enforcement of the Illinois Act. Id. at 2633.
14 Id. at 2634. Chicago Rivet also tried to get the Pennsylvania Securities Commission to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE but was unable to do so. Id. at 2634
n.3. In the meantime, Chicago Rivet had removed its state court action to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. This latter court denied
Chicago Rivets motion for a temporary restraining order. Id.
15 1d. at 2634.
16 Id.
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On February 2, 1979, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act against MITE. 17 MITE then proceeded
to make its tender offer to the shareholders of Chicago Rivet.' 8
On February 9, 1979, the district court entered its final judgment
permanently enjoining enforcement of the Illinois Act against
MITE on the ground that the Illinois Act was preempted by the
Williams Act and violated the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.19 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.2 Subsequently, the United States.Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction.2
A preliminary issue considered by the Supreme Court was
whether the case had become moot as a result of MITE having
entered into an agreement with Chicago Rivet shortly after the
district court entered final judgment.22 The court of appeals
thought this action had not rendered the case moot since, if the
court was to reverse the judgment of the district court enjoining
action against MITE, MITE would be exposed to both criminal
and civil liability for having made a tender offer in violation of
the Illinois Business Take-Over Act.2 Writing for a majority of
the Supreme Court on this issue, Justice White, in Part II of his
opinion, agreed with this position taken by the court of appeals.2 4
'7

Id.

18 Id. The tender offer took the form of an offer, published in the February 5, 1979,

issue of the Wall Street Journal,to all shareholders of Chicago Rivet whereever residing in
the United States. Id. In its Schedule 14D-1 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), MITE had indicated that it was willing to pay $28.00 per share for the outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of approximately $4.00 per share above the
then market price. Id. On the same day that MITE published its tender offer, Chicago
Rivet made an offer to buy approximately 40% of its own shares at $30.00 per share. Id.
19 Id.
20 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Edgar v.

MITE2 Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629 (1982).
1 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 451 U.S. 968.
2 102 S.Ct. at 2635. Under the agreement between MITE and Chicago Rivet,
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share for Chicago Rivet shares before March 12, 1979, or forego acquiring Chicago Rivets shares or assets. MITE decided
not to make a tender offer. Id. at 2634.
23 Id. at 2635.
24 Id.
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Justice White pointed out that since any suit brought by the Illinois Secretary of State to charge MITE with a violation of the
Illinois Act would be foreclosed if the Court were to agree with
the court of appeals that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional,
the case was not moot.25
In Part III of his opinion, Justice White considered the
charge that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.2 Determinations such as this, he said, have been held by the Court to turn on
whether the state statute actually conflicts with the federal statute or whether, if there is no direct conflict, the state law obstructs the fulfillment of the purposes and objectives of Congress
in enacting the federal statute.2 ' Noting that the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of which the Williams Act is a
part, do not expressly prohibit states from regulating takeoverss
and that there was no conflict between the provisions of the Illinois Act and the Williams Act that would make it impossible to
comply with both acts, 29 Justice White directed his inquiry to
whether the Illinois Act frustrated the aims and objectives of the
Williams Act.-3 In this respect, he agreed with the court of appeals that Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, had sought
not only to provide investors with full information regarding tender offers but also had sought to maintain the balance between
management and tender offerors so as not to frustrate the exercise of an informed judgment by investors. 3 ' He further agreed,

25
26

d.
1d.
1
27 d.See Bayv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,158 (1978).
28 Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
290 102 S.Ct. at 2635.

3 d.
31

1d. at 2636-37. The Senate Committee Report which accompanied the Williams
Bill stated:
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
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in Part IV of his opinion, that there were three provisions of the
Illinois Act which interfered with this congressional objective: 1)
the precommencement notification provisions requiring the minois Secretary of State to be notified twenty business days before
a tender offer becomes effective; 32 2) the hearing provisions of the
Illinois Act allowing the Secretary of State to hold hearings with
respect to tender offers covered by the Act; a and 3) the provisions
of the Illinois Act permitting the Secretary of State to pass on the
fairness of a tender offer. 4
As to the precommencement notification provisions, Justice
White agreed with the position of the court of appeals, stating:
[B]y providing the target company with additional time within
which to take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement
notification provisions furnish incumbent management with a
powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detri-

benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP.
No. 550, 90th Cong., lst Sess. 3 (1967).
32
See Part IV-A of Justice White's opinion. 102 S.Ct. at 2637-38. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act required that a takeover offer for the shares of a target company as defined by the Act be registered with the Secretary of State. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 112, §
137.54.A. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83). Before a takeover offer could become registered
under the Act, the offeror was required to file with the Secretary of State a registration
statement containing the information prescribed by the Act. Id. § 137.54.B. Registration
became effective 20 business days after the date the registration statement was filed. Id. §
137.54.E. In the meantime, the offeror could not make the takeover offer to the shareholders of the target company. Id. § 137.54.A. The offeror, however, was required to deliver a copy of the registration statement to the target company and was required, not
later than the date of the filing of the registration statement, to publicly disclose its intent
to make a takeover offer and the material terms of the proposed offer. Id. § 137.54.B.
3 See Part IV-B of Justice White's opinion. 102 S.Ct. at 2638-39. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act provided that the Secretary of State was to call a hearing if it was
deemed necessary for the protection of Illinois offerees, or if within 15 days after the filing
of the registration statement, a written request for a hearing was submitted to the Secretary by a majority of the directors of the target company who were not officers and employees of the target company or by persons residing in Ilinois who owned at least 10% of
the outstanding shares of any class of equity securities which were the subject of the takeover offer. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.57.A. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
34 See Part IV-C of Justice Whites opinion. 102 S.Ct. at 2639-40. Under the provisions of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, if the Secretary of State found, among other
things, that the takeover offer was inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud or
deceit upon the offerees, the registration of the takeover offer could be denied. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.57.E. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
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ment of the stockholders who will not have an offer before
them during this period.,"

Similarly, Justice White agreed with the court of appeals position
that "the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the tender
offer process,"'3 6 thereby upsetting "the balance struck by Congress by favoring management at the expense of stockholders." 37
As to the authority granted to the Illinois Secretary of State under

the Illinois Act to pass on the substantive fairness of a tender
offer, Justice White agreed with the position of the court of appeals that giving the Secretary of State such authority would conflict with the intent of Congress in passing the Williams Act to
recognize investor autonomy by providing investors with the in-

formation needed for them to make their own decisions.38
Turning to the charge that the Illinois Business Take-Over

Act violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Justice White reasoned, in Part V of his opinion, that the
Act did so violate the commerce clause for two reasons: 1) the act
purported to regulate interstate commerce directly, including
commerce outside the state; 3 and 2) the burden imposed on in-

as 102 S.Ct. at 2637.
36
Id.at 2638.
37 Id. at 2639.
38 Id. at 2639-40. Justice White referred to both the House and Senate reports accompanying the Williams Bill which had emphasized the aim of the bill to protect investors by providing them with full information regarding cash tender offers. Id. The Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency had remarked in its report: "The bill is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." S. REP. No.
550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
39 See Part V-A of Justice White's opinion. 102 S.Ct. at 2640-41. Justice White believed that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act differed from state blue sky laws which relate to the disposition of securities within a state and affect interstate commerce in securities only incidentally. By way of contrast, he noted that application of the Illinois Act
would necessarily involve interstate commerce since by their very nature tender offers for
securities of publicly held corporations require communication with shareholders scattered across the country. Id. at 2641. Referring to the Illinois Act, he remarked:
Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if not a single one of
Chicago Rivet's shareholders were a resident of Illinois, since the Act applies
to every tender offer for a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the corporation has its principal executive*office in Illinois, is organ-
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terstate commerce by the Illinois Act, even if it be treated as regulating interstate commerce only indirectly, outweighed any
40
local interests served by the statute.
In a dissenting opinion which Justice Brennan joined, Justice
Marshall argued that the case should have been dismissed as
moot. 41 His position was that the preliminary injunction issued
by the district court restraining the Illinois Secretary of State
from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE should be presumed
as intended to provide permanent protection to MITE against
any later attempted enforcement suits for actions of MITE during the period of the injunction whether or not the Illinois Act
was considered to be unconstitutional. 42 He contended that
"[u]nder the circumstances, it would be improper to permit the
State to penalize action taken while the injunction was in ef-

ized under Ilinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in
surplus representedin Illinois.
102 S.Ct at. 2641. Thus, he concluded, "the Illinois law, unless complied with, sought to
prevent MITE from making its offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with
Chicago Rivet's stockholders living in Illinois, but also with those living in other states and
having no connection with Illinois." Id. at 2641.
40 See Part V-B of Justice Whites opinion. Id. at 2641-43. Commenting that "[w]hile
protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective," but noting that "the state
has no legitimate interest in protecting non-resident shareholders," Justice White added:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources
to their highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.
Id. at 2642.
41 Id. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42
Id. at 2648-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justifying this position, Justice Marshall
added:
[Tihe preliminary injunction does not expressly state that it provides permanent immunity from penalties for violations of the Illinois Act that may
occur during its effective period .... However, I see no reason why the
presumption in favor of permanent protection should not be applied here. In
this context, as the District Court must have recognized, permanent protection was needed. Mite sought an injunction, not just.because it desired protection from enforcement actions during the period it was actually making
the tender offer, but also because it desired protection from such actions in
the future.
Id. at 2650 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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feet."43 Therefore, he concluded, no live controversy existed be44
tween the parties to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the case.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist agreed
with Justice Marshall that the case did not present a justiciable
controversy, but differed with Justice Marshall as to the reason
for its mootness. 45 Justice Rehnquist took the position that the
case was moot because of the fact that after the district court
issued its permanent injunction prohibiting the Illinois Secretary
of State from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE, MITE announced its decision not to pursue its tender offer. 4 He said that
since MITE was not presently engaged in activity covered by the
Illinois statute and since there was no indication that MITE intended to pursue such activity in the future, the facts giving rise
to the present controversy no longer existed. 47 Thus, the controversy before the Court no longer being live, the complaint should
48
be ordered dismissed.

Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor
joined in Part II of Justice White's opinion in which he treated
the case as not moot, and in Part V-B of his opinion in which he
treated the Illinois statute as violating the commerce clause of the
3

4

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

44 Id. at 2652 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In concluding that no live controversy

existed between the parties, Justice Marshall reasoned:
There is a live controversy in this case only if the State could seek penalties
from Mite. Here, the state could not seek penalties from Mite. It may be true
that the State could file a complaint if this Court were to lift the permanent
injunction. However, this fact is not enough to keep the case alive where, as
a matter of federal law, the complaint must be dismissed. If the action that
the State plans to commence in state court lacks any merit-if Mite has an
automatic defense to that action-then there simply is no controversy.
Id. (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 2652-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Pointing out that the Court had no power
over a suit not pending before it, Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
As the tender offer has met its demise for reasons having nothing to do with
the validity of the Illinois statute, the injunction is no longer necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it was obtained. Mite no longer needs an injunction in order to effect a tender offer for the shares of Chicago Rivet or
any other corporation subject to the Illinois Act. Nor does Mite need the in-

junction in order to preclude the Secretary from rescinding a completed tender offer.
Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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United States Constitution because it imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. 49 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
White's opinion on the mootness issue, but not as to his position
that interstate commerce was unduly burdened by the Illinois
statute. 50 Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, joined part V-B of
Justice White's opinion treating the Ilinois Act as an undue burden on interstate commerce but not in Justice White's position as
to the mootness issue in Part II of his opinion, agreeing with Justice Marshall on that issue. 5' Of the three Justices writing separate concurring opinions (Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor) only two (Justices Stevens and O'Connor) specifically spoke
to the preemption issue. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor stated
that because it was unnecessary to reach the preemption issue she52
was joining only Parts I, II and V of Justice White's opinion.
Justice Stevens, however, openly disagreed with Justice White's
position on the preemption issue, stating that although he agreed
with Justice White's assessment of the impact of the Illinois statute and therefore joined in Part V of his opinion, he did not join
his preemption holding. m
The effect of MITE on the judicial attitude toward state
takeover legislation is already being felt.m Nevertheless, in view
of the fragmented nature of the Supreme Court opinion in
MITE, the total impact of the decision on the constitutionality of
state takeover legislation may not turn out to be quite as sweep49 Id. at 2633 n.*. Justice O'Connor, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed with
Justice White that portions of the Illinois Act were invalid under the commerce clause. Id.
at 2643 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5o Id. at 2633 n.*.
51
Id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that he joined Part V-B
of Justice White's opinion because it left some room for state regulation under the commerce clause, which Justice Powell believed was important because the disparity of resources between a tender offeror and a takeover target can often work to the disadvantage
of a small target corporation. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
52
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
M Id. at 2647-48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54 See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,821 (D.C. Md., Sept. 3, 1982), in which the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, in declaring the Maryland Corporate Take-Over Law unconstitutional, invoked the commerce clause reasoning of MITE; Esmark, Inc. v. James
C. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982), in which the Supreme Court of Kentucky relied on
MITE in striking down the Kentucky Take-Over Act.
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ing as Justice White's opinion might suggest, particularly if state

legislation was framed in such a manner as to avoid the charge of
creating an excessive burden on interstate commerce.A5 Justice
Powell acknowledged this possibility when, in his concurring opinion, he said, "I agree with Justice Stevens that the Wil-

liam Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at
least in some circumstances-greater protection to interests that
include but often are broader than those of incumbent management."-6

B.

Insider Trading

Trading on the basis of material inside information was early
deemed to come within the broad prohibitions of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193457 and SEC rule 10b-5,-8
which condemn fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 59 Actually, however, although Congress was well aware of the evils of insider trading when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act, ® it was not section 10(b) that
was aimed at the evils of insider trading but rather section
55
See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 767, 784-85 (1971).
0 102 S.Ct. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring). By agreeing with Justice Stevens, Justice Powell appears to have thereby also agreed with the position of Justice Stevens on the
preemption issue for, in refusing to join Justice Whites holding on the preemption issue,
Justice Stevens had stated that he was not persuaded "that Congress' decision to follow a
policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against
state legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent management." Id. at
2648 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). For the text of this rule, see note 87 infra.
59 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub noma.
Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
60 The Senate Committee Report which accompanied the hearings that led to the
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had commented:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the
subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors
and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in
their market activities. Clearly allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while
not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of
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16(b),6 1 the short-swing trading provision of the Act.62 The scope
of section 16(b) in reaching insider trading activity is not as broad
as that now recognized under section 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5;63
nevertheless, section 16(b) remains a potent weapon for dealing
with insider trading activities and continues to spawn its share of
litigation in the securities fraud area.64
A recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton,"' raised the question as to
how direct the pecuniary benefit realized by a corporate insider
must be to bring such insider under the prohibitions of section
16(b).0 In this case, Horton, a director of CBI Industries, Inc.,
their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not
available to others.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
61 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
62 The relevant language of § 16(b) reads:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months,
unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit
to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse
to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
63 See Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 45, 61-63 (1968-69). In this Article, the author commented: "There is no
longer any reason for the federal courts to be harsh and objective in interpreting and
applying section 16(b). Everything that this section was designed to accomplish, and
much more, is presently being accomplished under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." Id. at
63.
64 See Deitz, A PracticalLook at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1974-75).
65 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982).
66 As the court of appeals put the issue in Horton:

[I]f a director sold 1000 shares in his company for $60 a share and within six
months bought 1000 shares for $40, the company could sue him for $20,000,
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served, along with a bank, as a co-trustee of trusts created by his
mother for the benefit of his two adult sons, both of whom were
full-time students living apart from Horton.67 In 1980, Horton
sold on the open market 3,000 shares of CBI stock which he
owned, and within six months bought on the open market for the
trust 2,000 shares of CBI stock at a lower price.6 The difference
in price amounted to $25,000. 69 CBI Industries, Inc. sued Horton
to recover this amount on the basis it constituted short-swing
profits realized by Horton in violation of section 16(b). 70 The
of Illinois
United States District Court for the Northern District
71
entered judgment in favor of CBI Industries, Inc.
The district court took the position that the purpose of section 16(b)-to prevent insiders from violating their fiduciary
duties by trading in the stock of their corporations on a shortterm basis-is violated "if an insider trades under the name of a
family member and, thereafter, realizes some direct or indirect
benefit." 72 The court said that in the case of short-swing profits
involving family members, one must look to the degree of control
possessed by the insider and the extent of the benefit enjoyed by
the insider from the profits realized. 73 The court found these two
elements present in the case of Horton, since he, as co-trustee of
his sons' trusts, jointly exercised control over all investments
made by the trusts and realized benefit from his operation of the
trusts by being spared the need to make gifts to the trusts in order
to provide for the economic security of his sons. 74 The court remarked that, in this context, "'benefits' for the purposes of sec-

his "profit" on the transaction (more realistically, the loss he averted by selling when he did). We have to decide in this case whether the "him" includes
his grown children, when they are beneficiaries of a trust of which the director is a co-trustee.
664.
Id. at 67
d.
681d.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton, 530 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. IMl.1982), rev'd, 682 F.2d
Cir. 1982).
643 (7th
72
d. at 785.
73 Id. at 785-86.
74 Id. at 786-87.
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tion 16(b), need not be 'direct' in order for an insider to be held
liable under the section. 75
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals differed with the district court's opinion that indirect benefit was enough to bring an
insider within the proscriptions of section 16(b),76 and held that
profit realized by a corporate insider must consist of direct pecuniary benefit.7 The court said that "it is not enough that ties of
affinity or consanquinity between the nominal recipient and the
insider make it likely that the insider will experience an enhanced
sense of well-being as a result of the receipt, or will be led to reduce his gift-giving to the recipient." 78 The court believed, therefore, that the case should be remanded to the district court to allow that court to decide whether CBI Industries, Inc. should be
given an opportunity to show liability on the part of Horton
under the "direct benefit" standard. 79 However, the court of appeals did agree with an alternative contention of Horton that
even if he derived sufficient benefit from the $25,000 profit made
by the trust to have violated section 16(b), he should not be held
liable for the entire profit.8 0 The court rejected "the view that the
profit nominally received by a third party must be attributed to
the insider either entirely or not at all."81 The standard of direct
pecuniary benefit, according to the court, "does not exclude an
attempt to measure any direct pecuniary benefit that he may
have received from the transaction even if that benefit was less
than $25,000."12
Although section 16(b) has long been noted for its automatic
nature, eliminating any need for a showing of intent to trade on
75 Id. at 786.

78 682 F.2d at 646.

77id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 647. The court said:
To prevail in this case, CBI therefore would have to show that the trust
was a sham; that despite its terms Horton was able to use income or assets of
the trust to pay his personal expenses. CBI has made no effort to prove a direct pecuniary benefit to Horton. But we shall leave it to the district judge to
decide, in the first instance at least, whether it should be given a chance to
try to prove liability under the standard adopted in this opinion.

Id.

go Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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Horton case should dispel some of the
concern that the section operates as a "trap for the unwary." As
the court of appeals remarked in Horton, to permit indirect
benefits resulting from emotional relationships within the family
to be the basis of liability under section 16(b) would "make an already Draconian strict liability statute still more Draconian."S
inside information,8 the

C.

Standing To Sue

Litigation involving section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,86 and SEC rule lOb-5, 87 continues unabated despite

8 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
84 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 882 (5th ed.
unabridged 1980). See generallyFeldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership UnderSection
16 of the SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1054 (1965-66).
85 682 F.2d at 647. In a separately written opinion, Judge Wood said that although
he concurred in the analysis of the majority on the pecuniary benefit issue, he believed that
he needed to dissent on the beneficial ownership issue since he preferred "to read 16(b) a
little more broadly so as to include 'immediate family' in its proscriptions." Id. at 648
(Wood, J., dissenting).
86 This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
87 The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c)To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

recent efforts on the part of the United States Supreme Court to
limit the scope of these provisions.m A number of the recent cases
brought under those provisions have raised questions relating to
the exact nature and scope of the limitations imposed by these
Supreme Court decisions."9 One such recent case was the Fourth
Circuit case of Gurley v. Documation, Inc. ,9involving the purchaser-seller standing requirement, popularly known as the Birnbaum rule, 9' approved by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.92 It has been clear since the decision of the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps that persons
claiming they were fraudulently induced not to purchase securities have no standing to bring a private damage suit under rule
10b-5. 3 In Gurley, the court was faced with the question of
whether persons claiming that they had deferred sales of stock as
a result of fraudulent misrepresentations made to them were similarly barred from maintaining such suits. 4
The plaintiffs in Gurley, Michael L. Gurley and David W.
Davis, had become shareholders in Documation, Inc. soon after
its incorporation.95 They alleged that they had been persuaded to
buy the Documation stock on the basis of a promise made to
them by S. Ray Halbert, a major shareholder and president of
88 See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo.L.J. 891 (1976-77).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), involving the
implications of the Chiarelladecision as to a criminal indictment charging misuse of nonpublic information regarding proposed mergers or take-overs. In Chiarella v. United

States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court had held that trading on nonpublic

market information by the employee of a printer did not constitute a violation of § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule iOb-5.

'0674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982).
91 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
92 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
93 The Blue Chip Stamps case was such a case, involving a complaint by nonshareholder customers of Blue Chip Stamp Company who complained that they had been dis-

couraged from buying stock in the company by an overly pessimistic prospectus issued by
the company. Id. at 726-27.
94 674 F.2d at 256. Delayed sales present a somewhat different problem from that in

which no sale at all takes place, because in the case of the delayed sale, a sale does ultimately take place. The Supreme Court made it clear in its Blue Chip Stamps decision that
its decision was intended to cover the "no-sale" cases. 421 U.S. at 737-38.
95 674 F.2d at 255.
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Documation, as well as its chairman and chief executive officer,
that they could "piggyback" future sales of their stock on any
public offering that might be made by the company.90 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs alleged that Halbert-with the help of Richard
J. Testa and members of the law firm of Testa, Hurwitz, and
Thibeault, who were serving as general counsel for Documation
and who were made defendants in the plaintiffs' suit-had made
plans for a public offering of the company's stock without disclosing this to them and without revealing to them that Halbert and
other shareholders of Documation would be piggybacking their
stock. 7 Instead, the plaintiffs claimed, Halbert and Testa informed them that they would not be permitted to piggyback on
any possible future public offering by Documation98 and that
under SEC rule 144w they could not sell their unregistered shares
for ninety days after the company commenced a registered public offering, whereas in fact, as the defendants knew, they were
entitled to sell their stock under other SEC rules. 100 The plaintiffs
claimed that the purpose of these misrepresentations and omissions was to support the price of Documation's publicly held
shares by keeping the plaintiffs' stock off the market. 101
In reliance on these claimed misrepresentations and omissions, Gurley sold 3,900 shares of Documation stock to an employee of the company for $6.50 per share. 10 2 Subsequently,
474,000 Documation shares were sold to the public at a price of
$17.00 per share on the basis of a registration statement filed
with the SEC.'0 These shares consisted of 300,000 new shares,
100,000 shares owned by Halbert and 34,000 shares held by
other piggybacking shareholders. 104 During the ninety day period
following the public offering, Gurley, who owned 19,900 shares
96 Id.

97 Id.
9 Id.
'9 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1981).

'00 674 F.2d at 255. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants knew that
rule 144 did not apply to the plaintiff's shares which were issued before the rule took effect. Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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of Documation stock, and Davis, who owned 46,900 shares of
such stock, attempted to sell their shares through stockbrokers.
They were unsuccessful in doing so, however, because the defendants, purporting to follow SEC rule 144, refused to make any
transfer of the plaintiffs' shares until ninety days after the public
offering.'10 After the ninety days expired, the plaintiffs sold their
stock over an extended period at prices ranging from $7.00 per
share to $10.54 per share. 1'1 The plaintiffs then brought suit
against Halbert, Testa and the Testa law firm, charging securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5.107
The district court dismissed the section 10(b) claims for failure to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, '0 relying on the Blue Chip Stamps case. 109
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims should be separated into three categories: 1) their claim that they were wrongfully prevented from
piggybacking their stock; 2) their claim that the defendants'
wrongful conduct prevented them from selling their stock for
ninety days after the public offering; and 3) Gurley's claim that
he sold 3,900 shares of Documation stock prior to the public offering as a result of deliberate misrepresentations by the defendants."0
The court had no difficulty-with the first and third claims,
holding that the first claim was not actionable under a straightforward application of Blue Chip Stamps since no sale of securities had taken place"' and that the third claim was actionable
because the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser or seller requirement
was clearly satisfied since an actual sale had taken place in reliance on the defendants' alleged misrepresentations." 2 As to the
second claim, the court, although recognizing that the Sixth Cir1o5 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 254.
108 Id. The plaintiffs appended to their federal cause of action state causes of action

based on fraud and breach of fiduciary duties, but the district court refused to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over these claims after having dismissed the federal claims. Id.
101 Id. at 255.
11 Id. at 256.
i' Id.
11

Id.

1982-83]

CORPORATIONS

cuit Court of Appeals had held "that a deferred sale is actionable
under § 10(b) if the sale took place sufficiently soon after the alleged fraud to support an inference that the seller acted in reliance on the fraud,"" 3 nevertheless believed that an analysis of the
policies underlying the Blue Chip Stamps decision persuaded
them "that one who claims that he was fraudulently induced to
delay a sale of securities must, like a nonseller, be denied stand-

ing under § 10(b).""4 Referring to the central concern expressed
by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps to reduce the incidence of nuisance suits under section 10(b)" 5 and also to concerns
about the ease with which parties could manufacture deferred
sales claims sufficiently plausible to survive summary proceedings," 6 the court believed that the deferred sales claims raised "a
high risk of the kind of spurious litigation which the Blue Chip
court sought to weed out."" v Accordingly, the court concluded:
"[W]e therefore hold that a plaintiff who claims he was fraudulently caused to delay the sale of securities lacks standing to sue
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act."' 18
One thing seems evident from holdings such as that reached
by the court in Gurley-the admonition of the Supreme Court in
Blue Chip Stamps for the lower federal courts to give "a straightforward application" to the purchaser-seller standing requirement is having its effect in reducing the earlier tendency of the
federal courts to adopt a liberal and expansive attitude toward
the scope and application of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." 9 As
113 Id. The Gurley court was referring to the decision in Marsh v. Armada Corp.,

533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
114674 F.2d at 257.
11 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. The court further remarked that "[a] deferred seller's allegations, like those of
a nonseller, are likely to rest in large part on his own oral testimony" and that "[tihe timing and volume of sales he would have undertaken but for the alleged fraud are almost inevitably matters of speculation." Id.
8
11
Id. While disagreeinig with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action on their § 10(b) claims, the court agreed with the position of the district
court that the statute of limitations provided by Virginia's blue sky law should apply to the
plaintiffs' § 10(b) claims. Id. at 259.
119 This earlier tendency was no doubt encouraged by the liberal attitude adopted by
the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971), in which the Court had spoken of the need to read § 10(b) "flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Id. at 12.
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the court said in Gurley: "[Slince private rights of action under §
10(b) arise by implication rather than by express congressional
directive, judicial resort to a restrictive rule of standing is appropriate to guard against abuse of the litigation process." 110
D. ManipulativeConduct
The effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on the attitude
of lower federal courts toward the scope of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 was further underscored by the recent decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shivers v. Amerco,' 2 involving
1
the type of conduct covered by these provisions. 22
The plaintiffs in Shivers were minority shareholders of
Amerco, the parent company of the nationwide U-Haul businesses. 12 The minority shareholders, who were mainly U-Haul
employees, freely traded their Amerco stock among themselves at
approximately 120% to 130% of its book value. In addition,
Amerco followed a policy of repurchasing stock from shareholders upon request at book value. 121 The plaintiffs alleged that
certain individuals, named as defendants in the action, who
owned some ninety-four percent of Amerco's stock and who were
also directors and officers of Amerco, determined to eliminate
the informal market in Amerco stock so as to enable Amerco to
acquire stock from the minority shareholders at a low price.2 It
120 674 F.2d at 257.
121 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982).
122 The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), stressed
the importance of the words "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as used in
§ 10(b). In holding that mere negligent conduct alone is insufficient to sustain a private
damage suit under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the Court remarked that "[t]he words'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that
§ 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at 197. Furthermore, the court held that the broader "fraud" language of rule 10b-5 could not expand
the conduct proscribed by Congress in § 10(b) since rule lob-5 was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission through authority granted to it under § 10(b). Id. at 21214. The Court commented that "[the rulemaking power granted to an administrative
agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law."
Id. at 213.
123 670 F.2d at 828.
124 Id.
125 Id.
12 6Id.
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was claimed that to accomplish this these individual defendants
called a special shareholders' meeting at which they voted their
1
stock so as to enable Amerco to declare a 100-for-I stock split. 2
Amerco then announced that in the future it would buy back the
stock of minority stockholders at only fifty percent of book
value. 12sThe plaintiffs also were denied permission to advertise
stock sales in Amerco World, Amerco's in-house newsletter. 12
This conduct resulted in some of the plaintiffs selling their stock
back to Amerco at substantially less than book value.'-1 The
plaintiffs filed suit alleging, inter alia, violations by the defen3 1 The district court disdants of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1
32
claims.1
missed the federal securities
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred
in dismissing their rule 10b-5 claims on the ground that defendants had violated rule 10b-5 "by failing to disclose material facts
in connection with plaintiffs' sale of Amerco stock, and by employing manipulative devices in connection with plaintiffs' sale
of stock.""' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs' federal claims had been properly dismissed since, in its
opinion, none of the plaintiffs met the purchaser-seller requirement for standing under rule 10b-5.134 In addition, however, the
court indicated that it doubted whether the defendants' actions
127
Id.
128Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 828 n.1. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon but later transferred to the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona. Following transfer of the original complaint to the District of Arizona, an
amended complaint was filed adding a claim under the blue sky laws of Washington.
Originally, the plaintiffs had alleged violations of the blue sky laws of Arizona, Nevada,
and Oregon and breach of fiduciary duties. Id.
New York
132 Id. The district court also dismissed the state blue sky laws claims and granted defendants summary judgment on the claim based on breach of fiduciary duties. Id.
133 Id.at 829.
134Id. The court treated the plaintiffs as in the category of shareholders who had
suffered loss in the value of their investment as a result of the conduct of the defendants
and thus precluded from having standing to sue under the decision of the Supreme Court
in Blue Chip Stamps. Id. The court believed this standing deficiency applied not only to
those plaintiffs who still held their stock in Amerco but also to those plaintiffs who had
sold their stock back to Amerco since by the time these latter defendants sold their stock
the effects of any deception perpetrated by the defendants had ceased. Id. at 829-30.
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in regard to the Amerco stock constituted the manipulative or deceptive conduct required to sustain a complaint under rule 10b-5
as established by the United States Supreme Court in Sante Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green.'," The court pointed to the fact that
"[t]he nature of the reverse stock split and the basic facts surrounding it" had been fully revealed to the Amerco shareholders,
thus eliminating the charge of deceptive conduct.' As to the
claim of manipulative conduct, the court noted that the plaintiffs
had not alleged "that defendants misled investors by artificially
depressing the price of Amerco stock." 137
The approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Shivers that
"plaintiffs can state a claim for manipulation only by alleging
that defendants artificially affected market activity in order to
mislead investors"'' 3 is particularly significant because it reflects
the position taken by the Supreme Court in Sante Fe Industries
that the term "manipulation" as used in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act should be treated as a word of art to refer
to such practices as "wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity."1 39
II.

A.

STATE CORPORATION LAW

AppraisalRemedy

One of the most difficult problems in connection with the appraisal remedy afforded minority shareholders when they dissent
I's 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe Industries, the Court, speaking through Justice
White, remarked that "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception." Id. at 473.
136 670 F.2d at 829. The plaintiffs had claimed that the "disclosure" requirement involved a duty on the part of the defendants to disclose "first, that defendants' actions were
part of a plan to destroy the market in Amerco stock; second, that defendants' intent was
to acquire the stock at a price below its true and fair value; and third, that defendants' actions would in fact destroy the market and decrease the value of Amerco stock." Id. This
attempt by the plaintiffs to treat the defendants' failure to reveal the adverse effect of their
conduct on the market for Amerco stock is reminiscent of the statement made by Judge
Goettel in Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), that persons are not
required to" 'characterize' the transaction with 'pejorative' words." Id. at 665.
137 670 F.2d at 829.
138 Id. (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
139 430 U.S. at 476. For a discussion of the implications

at 467-77).
of the Santa Fe Industries
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from certain types of corporate action has been that of valuing

the dissenting shareholders' stock.4 0 Several standards of value
may be used for valuing corporate stock but in the appraisal setting the elements of market value, earnings (or investment) value
and net asset value seem to predominate.' 4 ' All three of these elements may be used in any given appraisal proceeding and then
weighed in arriving at an overall valuation. 4 2 This procedure, re-

ferred to as the "Delaware block approach,"' 43 was approved recently by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Ford v. CourierJournalJob PrintingCo. 1
In the Ford case, Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., a producer of lithographic and letter press materials, arranged a sale
of its business to Stevens Graphics, Inc.14S A special shareholders'
meeting of Job Printing Company was called for the purpose of
approving the sale of the company to Stevens Graphics.4 6 At this
meeting, an overwhelming majority of the shareholders approved the sale. 47 Certain minority shareholders in Job Printing
Company voted against the sale'4 and elected to avail themselves
case, see Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980-81).
140 The appraisal right is a right given by modem corporation statutes to dissenting
shareholders to be paid the fair value of their stock in certain cases of fundamental corporate changes. See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 349 (2d ed. 1970).
Banks, Measuringthe Value of CorporateStock, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1974"See
'
75); Note, Valuation of Dissenters'Stock UnderAppraisalStatutes, 79 HARv. L. Rv.1453
(1965-66).
142 See Note, The Dissenting Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv.
629, 641 (1977) (contains chart showing the weights given to the elements of value used in
a group of selected valuation cases).
143See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Mass.
1979). Recently, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that the "Delaware block"
method of valuation should no longer exclusively control appraisal proceedings under
Delaware law but that "all relevant factors" in the valuation process should be considered.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA), Vol. 15, No. 6, Feb. 11, 1983,
at 327, 332-34 (Del. 1983).
144739 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionaryreview denied (Ky. Oct. 6,
1982). The opinion was authored by Judge Cant.
Id. at 553-54.
'46 Id. at 554.
147 Id.

148Id. Parties plaintiff (appellants on appeal) voted 4.9% of the company's shares
against the sale, and the executors of an estate who were not parties to the appeal voted
7.9 % of the outstanding stock against the sale. Id.
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of the provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act
which permit shareholders who dissent from a sale of all or substantially all the property or assets of a corporation otherwise
than in the regular course of business to demand payment of the
fair value of their shares from the corporation. 149 Job Printing
Company responded with an offer of $96.70 a share for the
stock, 50 but this offer and another offer of $150.00 based on a redemption plan were rejected. 151 Job Printing Company then filed
action in Jefferson Circuit Court asking the court to determine
the fair value of the shares.5 2 After the sale of certain real estate
which Job Printing Company had retained, the company increased its original offer of $96.70 per share to $131.00 per share,
but this offer was likewise rejected.1 0 Pursuant to the provisions
of the Kentucky appraisal statute,' 4 the court then appointed
two appraisers recommended by the parties.ss The appraisers
undertook the appraisal process and arrived at a figure of
$124.00 as the fair value of the stock. 156
The appraisers detailed in their report to the court the factors
they considered in making their appraisal.' l These included the
three elements of market value, earnings value and net asset
value which the parties to the suit had agreed and which the Supreme Judicial Court of Mainess has stated are the three elements to be considered in jurisdictions with statutes based on the
Model Business Corporation Act.' 59 The appraisers, in arriving at

19 See KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.400(1)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as

KRSI.
"50 639 S.W.2d at 554.
151 Id.
15 2 Id. See KRS § 271A.405(5).
15 639 S.W.2d at 554.

154 KRS § 271A.405(7).
- 639 S.W.2d at 554.
1' Id. at 555.
'57 Id.

18 See In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54,
59-60 (Me. 1979).
159 639 S.W.2d at 555. The Model Business Corporation Act is a product of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Model Act]. The Model Act was adopted in substantial part by Kentucky in
1972. See KRS chapter 271A. See also Hain, Kentucky Adopts a New Business Corporation Act, 61 KY. L.J. 73 (1972).
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their ultimate figure, emphasized the net asset value of the company, which they determined to be $165.00 per share. 160 They
then applied a twenty-five percent "marketability discount" factor to arrive at the ultimate figure of $124.00 per share for the
stock in recognition of, they said, the fact that Job Printing Company was not "'a public company and a closely held stock is considerably less attractive to an investor than a similar stock with
access to the public marketplace."" 6' The Court adopted the appraisal report, from which both an appeal and cross appeal resulted. 162 The minority shareholders argued that they were entitled to receive the entire $165.00 per share based on the net
asset approach, without the marketability discount,16 whereas
the Job Printing Company argued that the appraisers should
have used the earnings or investment approach, under which
they had fixed the value of the shares at $85.00 each. 14
The court of appeals rejected the respective contentions of
the parties as to the proper valuation approach to use and affirmed the position of the lower court. ' While holding that "in
all appraisals or valuations of fair value of stock, pursuant to KRS
271A.405, the three elements to be considered in computaton of
the fair value of the shares owned by dissenting stockholders are
market value, investment or earnings value, and net asset
value,""' the court conceded that the weight to be given these
component elements does not lend itself to mathematical exactness.'n Noting that the "marketability discount" used by the appraisers had given some weight to the market value of the stock,
the court concluded that "[t]he 25 percent reduction in net asset
"0 639 S.W.2d at 555.
161Id. at 556. Speaking of the discounts for marketability applied to non-public
companies, the appraisers remarked in their report that "'[these discounts, in general,
range between 20 and 50 per cent and reflect both the nature of the public market (which
was generally unreceptive to new issues at the valuation date) and the characteristics of
the subject company (in this case a small regional business with no express desire to go
public." Id.
162 Id.
163Id.
16 Id.
16

Id.

16 Id.
16

Id.
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value based on marketability was not an arbitrary or clearly erroneous figure."'
In a separate portion of its opinion, the court of appeals considered an argument by the plaintiff minority shareholders that
the award of eight percent interest on the appraised sum was not
fair and equitable and that the approach used in Delaware of
considering the rate of interest which the corporation must pay
on its borrowed money should be used.'11 Referring to the provisions of the Kentucky appraisal statute which provide that "[tihe
judgment shall include an allowance for interest at such rate as
the court may find to be fair and equitable,"'170 the court stated
that it was "not prepared to adopt such an approach in this case,
although if it is utilized by a lower court under proper circumstances this Court might not reverse."' 7' The court commented
that "[t]he lower court was familiar with the totality of the circumstances herein and we are not prepared to find that he
abused his discretion in fixing the interest at eight per cent." 72
While the opinion of the court of appeals in Ford may not
provide all the answers relating to the valuation process under
the Kentucky appraisal statute, it should prove helpful in establishing guidelines as to the elements of value to be used in arriving at appropriate valuations under the statute, particularly
'" Id. The court pointed out that "[tihe price of $124 per share herein might well
have been fixed by assignment of a 57 percent figure to the net asset value and 43 per cent
to the market value; or the appraisers might well have assigned a 55 per cent value to the
net asset, 25 per cent to market value, and 20 per cent to investment value." Id.
169 Id. at 10-11. The appraisal provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law
provide that "[i]n making its determination with respect to interest, the Court may consider all relevant factors, including the rate of interest which the corporation has paid for
money it has borrowed, if any, during the pendency of the proceeding." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(h) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
The 1978 revisions of the appraisal provisions of the Model Act made the interest
provision more specific by specifically defining the term "interest." See Model Act §
81(a)(4). This provision states that" 'interest' means interest from the effective date of the
corporate action until the date of payment, at the average rate currently paid by the corporation on its principal bank loans, or, if none, at such rate as is fair and equitable under
all circumstances." Id. See generally as to the 1978 changes in the appraisal provisions of
the Model Act, Conard, Amendments of Model Business CorporationAct Affecting Dissenters'Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587 (1977-78).
170 KRS § 271A.405(8).
i1 639 S.W.2d at 557.
172 Id.
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since, as the court remarked, this was a case of first impression
under Kentucky law.17
B.

Stock TransferRestrictions

Among other recent cases of interest involving state corporation law, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Durkee v. Durkee-Mower, Inc. 174illustrates the care
needed in drafting stock transfer restrictions to use language that
will cover all possible types of transfers.75
The specific issue in Durkee was whether a transfer order
pursuant to a divorce decree was within charter restrictions on
the transfer of stock. 17 Durkee-Mower issued Allen Bruce Durkee
323 shares of Class A and Class B stock which were placed in a
revocable trust for his benefit.'17 The articles of incorporation of
Durkee-Mower contained a provision requiring any holder of the
Class A or Class B stock of the corporation, the executor or administrator of any such holder, or the grantee or assignee of any
Class A or Class B shares sold on execution who desired to sell his
or her Class A or Class B shares to offer such shares to the directors of the corporation. 78 Patricia C. Durkee obtained a divorce
decree in probate court against Bruce Durkee on grounds of "desertion."' 79 The divorce decree ordered that Bruce Durkee assign
and deliver to Patricia Durkee 200 shares of Class A and Class B
stock that Bruce Durkee owned or controlled in DurkeeMower.180 Patricia Durkee then filed a complaint in the superior
court against Bruce Durkee, Durkee-Mower and the Durkee
trust to enforce the divorce decree and to require transfer of the
stock to her.18 1Durkee-Mower moved for summary judgment on

173Id. at 556. For a criticism of the use of weighted averages in valuing corporate
shares, see Schaefer, The Fallacyof Weighting Asset Value and EarningsValue in Appraisal of CorporateStock, 55 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1031 (1982).
174428 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1981).
175See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.18 (2d ed. 1971).
'76 428 N.E.2d at 141.
l7 Id.
178 Id.
179Id. at 140.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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the ground that Patricia Durkee was obligated under the terms of
the stock transfer restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation of Durkee-Mower to offer to sell the stock to DurkeeMower before the company was obligated to transfer the shares
into her name on the corporate records.18 2 The superior court
judge denied the motion of Durkee-Mower,a taking the position
"that the restrictions on stock transfer did not apply to assignments by order of the Probate Court because the transfer was not
a 'sale.' "'184
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
trial judge's ruling.1 8s Commenting that restrictions on stock
transfer were enforceable in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts unless "'palpably unreasonable,' "186 the court nevertheless
pointed out that "the restrictive provision is inoperative as to a
particular transfer unless the restriction specifically applies to the
transfer."'8 7 The court reasoned that the transfer restriction in
Durkee covered voluntary sales and sales upon execution but not
court-ordered assignments.'m Therefore, the court concluded,
since Durkee-Mower failed to include language in the stock
transfer restrictions that would cover "a court-ordered assignment pursuant to a judgment of divorce,"189 it would not "expand
the clear and unambiguous language of the corporate stock restriction and hold it applicable to a situation not provided for
when drafted." 190
The decision of the Massachusetts court in Durkee typifies
the judicial attitude of giving a strict construction to stock trans-

1821d.

83 Id.
Id. at 141. The superior court judge further ordered the corporation to record
upon the corporate stock book ownership by Patricia Durkee of 200 shares of Class A and
Class B stock and to issue to her stock certificates reflecting her ownership in each of the
184

classes of stock. Id.

185 Id. at 143. Durkee-Mower had filed a notice of appeal from the superior court
judgment and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had transferred the case from
the Appeals Court on its own motion. Id. at 140.
186 Id. at 141 (quoting Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 168 N.E. 521 (Mass. 1929)).
187 428 N.E.2d at 141.
188 Id. at 142-43.
189

Id. at 143.

19 Id. at 142.
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fer restrictions.' 91 For example, in a case where the restriction
read that "no transfer or sale" of stock was to be made without
first offering the stock for sale to the remaining shareholders, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky construed this language as not
covering a transfer by operation of law under a shareholder's
will. 192 The court treated the words "transfer" and "sale" as
synonymous, adopting the position that "It]he use of the word
'transfer' looks to a sale and has no natural application to any
other disposition." 1 However one may feel about either this
reasoning by the Kentucky Court or the interpretation given the
language of the transfer restriction in Durkee, decisions such as
these make it evident that for transfer restrictions to have their
intended effect of covering all possible types of transfers, the language chosen for expressing the restriction must be precise and
comprehensive enough to reach not only all types of voluntary
94
transfers but all types of transfers by operation of law as well. 1
C.

Buy-Out Arrangements

Closely allied to first option restrictions such as those involved in Durkee are buy-out arrangements whereby the corporation or other shareholders in the corporation are obligated to
purchase the stock of a shareholder upon the occurrence of a stipulated event or events. 95 A recent case from the Supreme Court
of Idaho, Rowland v. Rowland,9 6 illustrates the latitude courts
allow parties in setting the price to be paid for transfers of stock
under buy-out arrangements or first option restrictions. 197
191 See 2 F. O'NEAL, supranote 175, at § 7.18.
192

Taylor's Adm'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957).

193 Id. at 583.

194 For a criticism of the prevailing judicial attitude of giving strict construction to
stock transfer restrictions, see Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Biy-Sell Agreements, U. ILL. L.F. 139, 174.

195 Buy-out arrangements differ from first-option restrictions in making definite the
commitment of the corporation to purchase the shareholder's stock, whereas first-option
restrictions simply provide the corporation with the first opportunity to buy the stock before it is sold or transferred to someone else. First option and buy-out arrangements are
frequently combined as a means of protecting the estate of a deceased shareholder. See 2
F. O'NEAL, supranote 175, at § 7.23.
196 633 P.2d 599 (Idaho 1981).
197 As to setting the transfer price of shares, see 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 175, at §
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Rowland's Inc. was a closely held corporation organized in
1962 under the laws of Idaho to engage in the dairy business. 9 8
V.C. Rowland and his son, Tom Rowland, together owned
70,000 shares of stock in the corporation.2 9 Ben Rowland, a
brother of V.C., owned 70,000 shares of the corporation's stock
and Margaret Rowland, a sister of V.C., owned 35,000 shares. 2
At a board of directors meeting held on April 12, 1972, V.C. and
his son, Tom Rowland, were displaced as officers of the corporation and thereafter ceased to participate actively in the management of the business.01 Subsequently, V.C. and Tom sought to
force the sale of the assets of the corporation and to have the proceeds from the sale distributed to the shareholders. 212 The other
shareholders countered with an offer to purchase the stock interest of V.C. and Tom at book value.2 13 These offers were declined
by V.C. and Tom, who then sought a dissolution of the corporation.21 The district court found no conduct which would justify a
dissolution of the corporation, 2 °1 concluding that the only recourse available to V.C. and Tom was to have the corporation
buy their stock in accordance with provisions in the corporation's
bylaws,2 which provided that if a shareholder desired to sell his
or her stock in the corporation, and a market existed for the
stock, the shareholder was obligated to offer the shares of stock to
the corporation upon terms equal to those offered by the third
party.20 7 If there was no outside market for the sale of the stock,
the shareholder could require the corporation to purchase the
stock at book value.2 0 V.C. and Tom contended that this latter
provision of the bylaws should be declared unenforceable on the
198 633 P.2d at 601.
199

Id.

Id.
Id. at 602.
2Ws
20 Id.
2Id.
20
201

204

Id.

Id. at 602-03.
2W Id. at 603.
M

o Id. at 606.

Id. The bylaws further provided that the book value of the stock was to be the
certified book value of the stock as determined at the annual meeting of the board of directors. Id. The board of directors had established the book value of the corporation's shares
at their meeting of April 12., 1972, as $1.93 or $1.934 per share. Id.
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ground that it would be inequitable to require them to give up
their stock at book value when the book value did not reflect the
true value of the corporation. m
The Supreme Court of Idaho rejected the argument of the
'
following the general rule, as stated in American
Rowlands,210
211
that if a restriction on the alienability of stock is
Jurisprudence,
reasonable, it should be sustained, particularly as against shareholders who had assented to, or participated in, the adoption of
the bylaws. 212 Referring to the Rowlands, the court observed
that, "[a]t the time the bylaws were originally adopted, appellants assented to the inclusion in the by-laws of the provision empowering Rowland's Inc. to purchase the stock at book value
from a shareholder where there exists no outside market for the
sale of the stock." 21 3 The court also noted that the restriction
served "the salutory [sic] purpose of giving those who own stock
in the corporation the right to have control of the corporation
maintained in the Rowland family." 214 Accordingly, concluded
the court, the bylaws were "valid and binding on the share215
holders of the corporation."
Use of "book value" is not the only pricing formula that may
be used in formulating a stock transfer restriction, 21 6 and, as a
standard, it has the possible weakness of being based on historical cost rather than current value, thus leading to potential disparity between the price and the value of the shares at the time of
transfer.217 Nevertheless, as Professor Henn has pointed out,
"[r]ecent cases tend both to sustain the restraint as reasonable
209

Id.

210

Id.

211

See 18 AM. Jur. 2d Corporations§ 384 (1965).

212

633 P.2d at 607.
Id.

213

214 Id.
21
1 Id. For a Kentucky case showing a similar freedom given parties in fixing the
transfer price, see Kxebs v. McDonald's Ex'x, 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953).
216 Other pricing methods include use of a fixed dollar price (subject to periodic adjustment), a price based on capitalized earnings, or a price fixed by outside appraisers. See
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 479-81 (5th ed. unabridged 1980).
2'7 See generally as to the use of book value for setting the transfer price, 2 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 175, at § 7.24a.
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and to enforce buy-sell agreements and options despite substantial disparity between the price and the value of the shares." 218
D. Shareholder Voting
Not infrequently, members of a closely held corporation desire to offset the effects of majority rule by including provisions in
the corporate structure which give them a veto power, such as
through supermajority quorum and voting requirements for
shareholder and director action.2 19 While use of such requirements is now generally provided for in state corporation statutes,m a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama,
Roach v. Bynum, ' illustrates the importance of placing such requirements in the articles of incorporation rather than in the bylaws when so required by the applicable statute.22
In Bynum, Roach, as the sole shareholder and director of
The Legal Center, Inc., adopted new bylaws establishing seventy percent quorum and voting requirements for both shareholder
and director action. At this same meeting, as Legal's sole shareholder, Roach elected himself and James Forstman to serve as the
directors.21 At a meeting of the board of directors of Legal which
followed, Roach was elected to serve as president-treasurer and
Forstman as vice president-secretary.m The ownership of the
corporation was realigned so that Roach and Forstman would
218

H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 282, at 561 (2d ed. 1970).

219 See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 175, at § 4.02.
220 Id. § 4.14. At one time use of supermajority quorum or voting requirements was

called into question as violative of a state policy demanding that all corporations formed
under the laws of the state have a representative form of government. See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 60 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1945). The New York Court of Appeals said:
"But this State has decreed that every stock corporation chartered by it must have a representative government, with voting conducted conformably to the statutes, and the power

of decision lodged in certain factions, always more than half, of the stock." Id. at 831. The
effects of the Benintendi case were overcome in New York by enactment of statutory pro-

visions specifically authorizing use of high quorum and high vote requirements. The present provisions appear in N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAW §§ 616, 709 (McKinney 1963).
2" 403 So. 2d 187 (1981).
222 See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 175, at § 3.79.

2 403 So. 2d at 188-89.
2AId. at 189.
25 Id.

1982-83]

COPOaRONS

each own 500 shares of the Legal stock.m In a separate shareholders agreement, Roach and Forstman obligated themselves to
vote for each other as directors of Legal and to vote for Roach as
president-treasurer and Forstman as vice president-secretary.w
The two men then undertook to finance the construction of an
office building in which they planned to maintain their separate
law offices. m Before completion of the building, a special shareholders meeting was held at which Bynum, another practicing
attorney, was elected to serve as a third director of Legal.m
Bynum was issued 500 shares of Legal stock and was elected secretary of the corporation. m A shareholders agreement similar to
the one previously executed by Roach and Forstman was executed by the three men, each of whom now owned a one-third
interest in the enterprise.23 Under this new agreement, the three
men were to vote for each other as directors and vote for Roach
as president-treasurer, Forstman as vice president and Bynum as
22
secretary.
Soon after the office building was completed, disagreements
arose among the three men as a result of which Forstman removed his law practice from the building. At a special shareholders meeting, attended by all three, each was re-elected to the
position of director, but Forstman refused to vote for Roach as
president-treasurer. Due to the high vote requirements of the bylaws, this left Roach as the holdover president-treasurer.
Later, at the annual meeting of Legal, Forstman nominated
himself and Bynum as Legal's only directors and nominated
Bynum as president-treasurer, and himself as vice president-secretary.m However, these nominations failed because of the inability to secure Roach's assent, and Roach again remained the

22

6 Id.

W

Id. at 189-90.
at 190.

28 Id.

29 Id.
230
Id.
23 Id.
232 Id.
3

2 3Id.

234 Id.
=Id. at 190-91.
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holdover president. 20 Bynum and Forstman then sued for dissolution of the corporation, and Roach counterclaimed for specific
performance of the shareholder agreement. 2 7 The trial judge
found the corporation hopelessly deadlocked and ordered the
corporation dissolved. m
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the
order of the trial judge, 2 9 stating that even though the circumstances appeared to indicate a director deadlock, "we think that
the power to break this and any other deadlock is held by Legal's
shareholders." 24 0 The court pointed to the provisions of the Alabama Business Corporation Act in effect at the time Legal was
formed, 24 ' which authorized use of high vote requirements for
shareholder action through provisions contained in the certificate
of incorporation. 242 From this the court concluded that "[a] provision mandating a greater than majority shareholder vote is
valid only if set forth in the certificate of incorporation, and a bylaw which purports to impose the same requirement is void."' m
Therefore, the court said, "the shareholders themselves hold the
power to break any deadlock which may have arisen from
Legal's existing bylaws." 24
Since the effect of this decision by the court in Bynum would
appear to have placed the control of the corporation in Forstman
and Bynum to the exclusion of Roach, the seriousness of the failure to place veto provisions in the proper corporate document is
evident. 24 5 As Professor O'Neal has observed, "[w]henever a dis236 ld. at 191.
237 Id.
238

Id.

29 Id. at 193.
240 Id. at 192.
241 Id. at 193. Alabama adopted a new Business Corporation Act, effective January

1, 1981. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-1 to -339 (1975, repl. vol. 1980).
242 403 So. 2d at 193. The provision, as quoted by the court, stated that "[t]he certificate of incorporation may contain provisions requiring for any corporate act the vote of a
larger proportion of the stock or any class thereof than is required by this chapter." Id. "
(quoting ALA. CODE § 10-2-23 (1975) (repealed 1981)). The present provisions for supermajority shareholder quorum and voting requirements are contained in ALA. CODE §§ 10-

2A-52, -54 (1975, repl. vol. 1980).
403 So. 2d at 193.
244Id.
245 The provisions of the present Kentucky Business Corporation Act indicate the
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tinction is made in judicial decisions on the validity of a particular clause, depending on whether it is in the charter or in the
bylaws, the charter clause is usually sustained and the bylaw invalidated."' ' 6 Therefore, as he says, it becomes evident that "the
lawyer may be wise to use the approved instrument." 247 Otherwise, the beneficial effect of provisions designed to protect minority interests may be thwarted.2

care with which statutory language must be read. As to shareholder action, any change in
quorum requirements must appear in the articles of incorporation. See KRS § 271A.160.
This same section also provides that if a quorum is present, the affirmative vote of the majority of the shares represented at the meeting is sufficient unless "the vote of a greater
number... is required by this chapter or the articles of incorporation or bylaws." Id.
(emphasis added). However, if the vote requirement is to be higher than that required for
designated types of corporate action by the corporation statute, then the increased requirement must appear in the articles of incorporation. Id. § 271A.655. As to director action,
increases in quorum or voting requirements may appear in either the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Id. § 271A.200.
246 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 175, § 3.79, at 114-15.
247 Id. § 3.79, at 115.
248 As the court observed in Bynum, "The requirement of unanimity or high
quorum/vote for shareholder and director action is one of the most effective methods of
protecting the interests of the minority shareholders and preventing the majority from
'squeezing out' the minority." 403 So. 2d at 192.

